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The debate over the norm of belief is an important issue in contemporary epistemology. 
Firstly, according to Timothy Williamson’s ‘knowledge first’ epistemology, Williamson 
argues for knowledge norm for belief (KNB, in short). Secondly, except for KNB, there 
are two different theories about norm of belief, such as truth norm of belief (TNB, in 
short) and no norm of belief (NNB,in short).Williamson refutes TNB and defends his 
KNB. Thirdly, aiming at the debate over the three different theories about the norm of 
belief, I will refute TNB and NNB from the point of Williamson. At the same time, some 
epistemologists have criticized KNB and thought that KNB, as a theory of norm of belief, 
itself is not reasonable. I will refute this refutation and use the principle of ‘knowledge 
implies truth’ to defend KNB furtherly. 
 
In chapter one, I will introduce Williamson’s epistemology. Williamson argues that 
knows is the most general factive mental state. Hence Williamson’s epistemology also 
been called ’knowledge first’ epistemology. This epistemology including three themes, 
the first is that knowledge is unanalyzable. The second is that know is unluminositical, 
knowledge equals evidence (E=K).The last one, Williamson thinks that knowledge is 
prior to belief, so he rejects traditional epistemology which insist belief is first. By those 
reasons, Williamson deems that the aim of belief is knowledge, and so knowledge 
provide norm for belief. 
 
In chapter two, I will discuss three different theory about norm of belief. Ralph 
Wedgewood and Daniel Whiting thought that the norm of belief is truth, so they agree 
TNB. Beside, there are another view of norm of belief which is that no norm of belief. 
David Papineau and Kathrin Glüer support this opinion, they agree the idea that there no 
















will explain Williamson’s unti-TNB argument and then give a defense for KNB.   
 
In the final chapter, I will probe into the dilemma and problems of TNB, this problem is 
also suffered by NNB. Williamson’s refutation to TNB is not successful, moreover, he is 
not response to NNB. So in my opinion, in order to prove that KNB is the best theory 
among the three theories, it is necessary for me to have a further refutation for TNB and 
NNB. Lastly, the principle of ‘know implies truth’ will help me to make a further defense 
for KNB. 
 



































引 言 ...................................................................................................................................................... 1 
第一节  国内外研究综述 ............................................................................................................ 1 
第二节  选题意义 ........................................................................................................................ 3 
第三节  文章结构安排 ................................................................................................................ 4 
第一章  威廉姆森的“知识优先”的知识论 .................................................................................... 6 
第一节  知道是最一般的事实性的心灵状态 ............................................................................. 6 
第二节  威廉姆森的知识主题 .................................................................................................... 8 
一   知识是不可分析的....................................................................................................... 9 
二   知道是不透明的 ........................................................................................................ 11 
三   知识等于证据（E=K） ............................................................................................ 14 
第三节  “知识优先”抑或“信念优先” ............................................................................... 17 
一   信念在概念上并没有优先于知识 ............................................................................. 17 
二   信念是不可靠的 ........................................................................................................ 18 
三   知识优先抑或信念优先 ............................................................................................. 19 
第二章  信念的规范理论之争 .......................................................................................................... 21 
第一节  威廉姆森的信念的知识规范理论 ............................................................................... 21 
一   断定及其规范 ............................................................................................................ 22 
二   断定的知识规范与信念的知识规范 ......................................................................... 24 
第二节  信念的真之规范 .......................................................................................................... 26 
一   真之规范释义 ............................................................................................................ 26 
二   三种真之规范解释..................................................................................................... 28 
第三节  信念的无规范理论 ...................................................................................................... 33 
一   帕皮诺的无信念规范性理论 ..................................................................................... 33 
二   葛吕尔和维克佛斯的反信念规范理论 ..................................................................... 35 
第四节  威廉姆森对信念的真之规范理论的反驳 ................................................................... 38 
第三章  对信念的知识规范的进一步捍卫 ...................................................................................... 41 
第一节  信念的真之规范理论面临的困境与难题 ................................................................... 41 
第二节  信念的无规范理论所面临的困境 ............................................................................... 43 
第三节  对信念的知识规范理论的进一步辩护 ....................................................................... 47 
第四节  结语 .............................................................................................................................. 49 
参考文献 .............................................................................................................................................. 51 






















Introduction ............................................................................................................................................. 1 
Part I Review of domestic and foreign research .......................................................................... 1 
part II Significance of the study .................................................................................................... 3 
part III Article structure ................................................................................................................ 4 
Chapter I 'Knowledge first'theory ........................................................................................................ 6 
Part I 'Know'is the most general factive mental state ................................................................. 6 
part II  Themes of Williamson's epistemology ........................................................................... 8 
        1 Knowledge is unanalysable .................................................................................................. 9 
2 Know is unluminnosity ...................................................................................................... 11 
        3 Knowlwdge equals evidence(E=K)……………………………………………………… 14 
part III 'Knowledge first'or'belief first' ...................................................................................... 17 
1 Belief is not prior to knowledge in concept ....................................................................... 17 
2 Belief is unreliable ............................................................................................................. 18 
        3 'Knowledge first' or 'belief first' ………………………………………………………… 19 
Chapter I Debates among three different norm of belief .................................................................. 21 
Part I Knowledge norm of belief(KNB) ...................................................................................... 21 
1 Assertion and it's norm ....................................................................................................... 22 
        2 Knowledge norm of assertion(KNA) and KNB…………………………………………  2 4 
part II Truth norm of belief(TNB) .............................................................................................. 26 
1 Explanation of  TNB ........................................................................................................ 26 
        3 Three accouns of TNB ……………………………………………………………………28 
part III No norm of belief(NNB) ................................................................................................. 33 
1 Papineau's theory of  NNB ............................................................................................... 33 
2 Glüer and Wikforss's theory of NNB ................................................................................. 35 
part IV Williamson's refutation of TNB ..................................................................................... 38 
Chapter III A further defence for KNB ............................................................................................... 41 
Part I  The dilemma and problem of TNB ............................................................................... 41 
part II  The problem of NNB ..................................................................................................... 43 
part III  A further defence for KNB .......................................................................................... 47 
part IV  Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 50 
References ............................................................................................................................................. 51 










































                                                        
① DeRose,K:Review of Timothy Williamson, Knowledge and It’s Limits [J],British Journal for the philosophy of 
Science,2002:P.573.  
② Harman,G:Reflection on Knowledge and It’s Limits, [J] The Philosophical Review.2002:p.417.  
















有少量的学术论文面世，具有代表性的论文是郑伟平发表在 2015 年第 4 期的《哲学
研究》上的《论信念的知识规范》一文。此外，抛开信念规范论题，专门论述威廉
姆森的知识理论的文章也不多，其中比较有代表性的文章有：陈波在 2009 年第 1
期发表在《晋阳学刊》上的《深入地思考，做出原创性贡献——威廉姆森访谈录》；












































是 2013 年牛津大学出版社出版的由陈（Timothy Chan）主编的论文合集《信念的目
标》，这本书主要集中了关于信念的规范论争的比较具有代表性的学术论文。第二部
是 2013 年由牛津大学出版社出版的吉布斯（John Gibbons）关于信念规范的专著《信
念的规范》一书。这本书主要是讨论信念的知识规范、真之规范和确证规范这三个
认知概念之间的内在关系。 
最后，关于信念规范问题欧美知识论学界曾多次专题研讨会：2009 年 9 月挪威
奥斯陆帝国大学召开了“信念目标”讨论会，2011 年 11 月英国南安普顿大学召开
了“目标与规范”研讨会，2013 年 6 月英国卡迪夫大学举行了以“规范性与信念伦
理学”为名的学术研讨会，2014 年 5 月英国伯明翰大学召开了以“信念”为主题的








     一 学术意义 
     对于信念规范理论的研究，相较于欧美知识论学界对这一问题所作出的火热的
讨论态势，“信念研究是国内知识论学界研究的相对薄弱的环节。”①加之信念概念本
                                                        
















































































   






































                                                        
① Jennifer Nagel: knowledge as a Mental State in Oxford Studies in Epistemology [M] 2011:P.9. 
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1: Goldman, A:Simulating minds: The philosophy psychology and neuroscience of mindreading. [M] New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2006.    
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为心智状态，心理状态等，鉴于这些术语表达的是同一意思，同时为了保持行文流畅和术语一致，都统一
翻译为心灵状态。 
④ Adam Leite: On Williamson’s Arguments that Knowledge Is a Mental state [J] Ratio new series 2005,P.165. 





















本身就是一种心理关系，以至于对每个命题 P 来说，有和 P 的这种关系就是心






状态。首先，知道是一种事实性（factive）态度，知道命题 P 就是主体对命题 P
有所亲知。举例来说，如果 P 是这样一个命题：今天是晴天。主体只有基于今天
是不是晴天这一事实才能知道或不知道 P 这个命题，而这种基于晴天与否的事实








“SΦSA”表明 S 持有一个以 A 为内容的命题态度 Φ。总之，用三段式推理我们
可以如此表达 FMSO： 
前提 1：如果 Φ是一个 FMSO，那么人们就能从“SΦSA”推出 A。 
前提 2：“知道”是一个 FMSO. 
                                                        
① 在威廉姆森看来，关注这一类命题知识也就代表了关注亲知知识。其认为“如果 P 是一个命题，我们不
仅把知道 P 理解为亲知 P，而且理解成知道事情是如此，事情是如此，当且仅当 P 为真”《知识及其限度》 
P 25 
② Williamson T:Knowledge and its Limits [M] London: Oxford University Press,2000:P.21. 
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